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Beijing has many ambitious plans for the 29
th
Olympiad, including its Olympic torch relay, will
have traversed the longest distance, covered the
greatest area (even reaching the peak of Mount Everest),
and involved the largest number of people in Olympic histo-
ry. Beijing modelled its torch on the so-called “lucky cloud,”
and designated “the journey of harmony” as the theme of
the torch relay, with “light the passion, share the dream” as
its slogan. However, the Taiwan authorities firmly rejected
Beijing’s plans to route the “lucky cloud” through Taipei,
and declared that Taiwan did not to share Beijing’s “dream”
or its idea of “harmony.” Why did Taipei make an issue of
Beijing’s Olympic torch relay? The answer lies in the debate
over national representation and Taiwan’s refusal to be seen
as part of China. 
Many people may be puzzled by the politicization of sports
reflected in the torch relay dispute. But disagreements
between Beijing and Taipei over who represents China are
nothing new and have plagued the Olympic movement since
the early 1950s. At the same time, there is a major differ-
ence between the current dispute and the earlier version,
which lasted from the 1950s until 1980s. 
In the previous dispute, both Beijing and Taipei agreed
there was only one China, and their disagreement focused
on the question of who represented that China. During the
1960 Rome Olympic Games, when the International
Olympic Committee asked Taipei to march under the name
of Taiwan in the opening ceremony, Taipei protested by
marching behind the card “Under Protest” to remind the
world that it wanted to represent China, not Taiwan. In the
1976 Montreal Olympic Games, when the Canadian gov-
ernment demanded that the Taiwanese team take part in the
Games under the name of Taiwan, Taipei chose to walk out.
Since the 1990s, however, Taipei has tried to create a
Taiwan identity separate from China by purging any link to
the name of China. The torch relay fiasco clearly demon-
strates Taiwan’s new obsession, especially under the
Democratic Progressive Party, with not sharing an identity
with Beijing. 
This paper will examine the case of the PRC’s first involve-
ment in the Olympic Games in 1952 and explain the histor-
ical background of the dispute between Beijing and Taipei
over the national representation issue in the Olympic move-
ment. In the process of exploring why the newly established
People’s Republic of China (PRC) decided to take part in
This paper, through a case study of Beijing’s involvement in the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games, provides a crucial
historical analysis of China’s current obsession with the Olympic movement and the ongoing Beijing/Taipei dispute
over the national representation issue. It demonstrates that both Beijing’s all-out campaign for the 2008 Games and
the argument across the Strait about who should or should not represent China are nothing new, and are rooted in
past experience.
* This article is adapted from Xu Guoqi’s book Olympic Dreams: China and Sports,
1895-2008, Harvard University Press, May 2008. 
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the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games, how the International
Olympic Committee and Taipei responded to Beijing’s plan,
and what was the significance and implications of Beijing’s
participation in the 1952 Olympic Games, this paper makes
use of materials that only very recently became available to
shed light on this complicated and long-neglected issue.
Apart from providing the historical background of the dis-
pute, this paper also shows that Beijing’s recent obsession
with the Olympics is not new, and that the newly estab-
lished PRC regime exhibited a strong interest in the
Olympic movement from the outset. Beij ing’ s  deci sion to  take partin  the 1952 Olympic  Games
Pierre de Coubertin founded the modern Olympiad in a
spirit of “all games, all nations.” (1) In a dispute over the par-
ticipation of Bohemia and Finland in the 1912 Games,
Coubertin reminded the parties that there existed a “sports
geography” that was quite “distinct from the political geog-
raphy.” (2) But Coubertin was perhaps too optimistic; individ-
ual governments seldom bought into his high idealism when
political interests and issues of legitimacy were involved.
Some states, though not all, did as they pleased when it
came to dealing with the Olympic Games, as when Great
Britain refused to allow Ireland to participate independently
in the seventh Olympiad in 1920. The Irish athletes
responded by refusing to compete under the British flag. (3)
Until sometime around the early 1990s, the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) made a point of stating that it
recognized National Olympic Committees (NOCs), not
nation-states, and as a result, the IOC could in principle cer-
tify an NOC for any territory. For instance, under U.S. ter-
ritories there are three NOCs: the USOC, the Puerto Rico
NOC, and the Guam NOC. Under the British Empire
there were also multiple NOCs, including Hong Kong’s
NOC, certified by the IOC. The best examples on this
point are the IOC’s certification of two Korean (North and
South) and two German (East and West) NOCs. (4)
In dealing with participation of Beijing and Taipei in the
Olympic movement, however, the tried and tested IOC
principle ran into big trouble. For 30 years after the found-
ing of the PRC in 1949, when the Nationalist government
fled to Taiwan, Beijing and Taipei used sports as an impor-
tant vehicle for pressing their political legitimacy in the
world. Each government claimed to represent China and did
everything possible to block the other from membership in
the Olympic movement. Heated disputes surrounding their
respective membership claims plagued the international
Olympic movement for years. The problem was so serious
that IOC chancellor Otto Mayer complained, “The quarrel
of the ‘two Chinas’ has been, from 1954 on, the main bur-
den of Olympism.” (5)
The question is why the Chinese case has been so difficult
and problematic for the IOC to handle. It is impossible to
explore the full range of reasons in this essay, but I would
like to highlight some key differences between the Chinese
case and the others mentioned above. 
First of all, over the period from 1949 to the late 1970s,
both Beijing and Taipei believed there was only one China,
and the key dispute between them was over who truly rep-
resented the Chinese nation. Each side declared that it was
the legitimate government of China, while the other was a
mere pretender, and both swore that the legitimate govern-
ment would never allow the “rebel” government to play a
role in international organizations (han zei bu liang li). 
Secondly, both governments linked membership in the
Olympic movement with political legitimacy, and seemed to
ignore or not to understand Olympic principles and IOC
rules. This explains why both Beijing and Taiwan were so
persistent and intensely engaged in the membership fight.
The IOC’s inconsistency and incompetence in handling
Chinese membership in the Olympic movement only made
the issue of China’s representation more difficult to manage.   
The year 1949 was supposed to be a turning point in
Chinese history; the Chinese Communists had come to
power and sent the Nationalists packing. From the perspec-
tive of the PRC, the Republic of China ceased to exist
when the Communist government took over the mainland,
and Taiwan was merely a renegade province that had no
place in the international sport federations and Olympic
movement. However, the Olympics were not a priority for
the Communists when they first came to power. They may
not have even been aware that China had been a member
of the Olympic movement for many years, and that one of
1. Coubertin, Olympic Memoirs, Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1997, 126.
2. Coubertin, ibid, 138.
3. The New York Times, 21 July 1920, 23.
4. For an excellent study on the case of Puerto Rico, see John MacAloon, “La Pitada
Olympica: Puerto Rico, International sport, and the constitution of politics,” in Edward M.
Bruner, ed., Text, Play, and Story; the construction and reconstruction of self and socie-
ty, Prospect Heights, IL, Waveland Press, 1988, 315-355. For the most recent examina-
tion of the Korean case, see Brian Bridges, “Reluctant Mediator: Hong Kong, the Two
Koreas and the Tokyo Olympics,” International Journal of the History of Sport, 24, No. 3,
March 2007. 
5. Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement,
New York, Columbia University Press, 1984, 145.
N o  2 0 0 8 / 120
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
the three Chinese IOC members, Dong Shouyi, had cho-
sen to remain on the mainland after 1949. (6) The top
Communist leaders were so busy consolidating power,
nation-building, and fighting the United States in the
Korean Conflict that the upcoming 1952 Helsinki Olympics
were not even on their radar screen. Had the Soviet Union
not intervened, the PRC might not have considered itself to
have a stake in the Olympic Games until much later. By rais-
ing the issue when they did, the Soviets facilitated the
Communist government’s participation in the games,
although it was too late for China to actually compete. 
Since Beijing had not yet set up a sports commission, the
government used the Communist Youth League as a facili-
tator for sports. Only after taking part in the 1952 Helsinki
Olympic Games did Beijing consider that it might be desir-
able to establish a separate sports federation. The Chinese
Communist Youth League representatives, on their return
from Finland, prepared a report on China’s participation in
the Helsinki Games for Liu Shaoqi, the number-two person
in the Communist system, suggesting that Beijing establish a
ministry-level sports commission headed by a high official
such as a vice-premier. This suggestion was accepted, and
He Long, a top military man, assumed leadership. (7)
Why was the USSR interested in Beijing’s involvement?
The answer is simple: international politics. After World War
II, the USSR reversed its former refusal to join corrupt cap-
italist sports events and decided to compete in every area, to
demonstrate the superiority of Russia’s political system and
society. In 1950 the IOC accepted the Soviet Union’s offi-
cial sports organization as a national Olympic committee, and
the 1952 Helsinki Games were Communist Russia’s first
Olympic appearance. The participation of the Soviet Union
in the Olympic movement was important both for sports and
for international politics. Avery Brundage, IOC President
from 1952 to 1972, wrote in his unpublished memoir that
“for the first time in forty years the Russians participated—
and the large and well-organized team from the Soviet Union
which came to Helsinki astonished the world by its outstand-
ing performance.” (8) The Soviets realized the importance of
this as well. A 1953 editorial in a Russian newspaper
expressed how pleased Russians were over the 1952
Helsinki Games. It proclaimed, “The Russian people are
ready to open their doors … the Iron Curtain will be lifted for
all sportsmen from all over the world.” (9) Brundage did not
realize that the USSR’s entry into the Olympic movement
and the subsequent Soviet push for Beijing’s membership in
the Olympic movement would force the IOC to deal with the
two-China issue even before Beijing’s own sports organiza-
tion was properly ready. The Soviet Union had every reason
to demonstrate its solidarity with the new communist regime
in China and to groom it as a close ally in the Cold War. 
The Russians seem to have brought the Olympics issue to
Beijing’s attention in 1951. Beijing’s foreign ministry was
informed by Helsinki, which was under strong Russian sway
politically and diplomatically, that Finland would like to have
Beijing to take part in its 1952 Olympic Games. Finnish
enthusiasm for the PRC’s participation made then-IOC
President J. Sigrid Edström uneasy, since he had no desire
to get embroiled in the tricky China issue. (10) Beijing, being
unfamiliar with world sports, did not initially take Finland’s
invitation seriously, (11) but a sharp prod from the Russians
the next year quickly sent Beijing into action. On 2
February 1952, the Soviet ambassador to Beijing made an
urgent inquiry as to whether Beijing would send a delegation
to the 1952 Games and whether the new China would join
the Olympic movement and attend the IOC meeting on 15
February 1952. Following his meeting with the Soviet
ambassador that day, Feng Wenbin, Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Youth League, wrote a report to
Premier Zhou Enlai concerning China’s potential participa-
tion in the 1952 Games. This report, which has become
available to scholars only recently, explains that the Russian
had asked Feng to tell the Russian embassy immediately
what China’s attitude was toward Olympic participation.
According to the report, the Soviets were under the impres-
sion that Beijing was not a member of the Olympic family
while Taiwan was. The ambassador reminded Beijing that
participation in the Olympics was an important political
issue, and he even suggested that his government was will-
ing to train Chinese athletes so the Russians and Chinese
could attend the Games together. 
6. The other two, Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi, decided to leave. Kong lived in the
United States after 1949, while Wang resided in Hong Kong.
7. Beijing’s National Olympic Committee was not established until November 1952. For
details on the impact of the Helsinki Games on Beijing’s thinking, see the report to the
Party’s central committee from China’s delegation to the 1952 Olympic Games, 21
August 1952, which can be found in Rong Gaotang, Rong Taotang tiyu wen lun xuan
(Selected articles and speeches of Rong Gaotang on sports), Shanghai: Huadong shifan
daxue chubanshe, 1992, 5-8. See also Li Lie, ed. He Long nianpu (Chronological biog-
raphy of He Long), Beijing: Ren min chubanshe, 1996, 519-520.
8. Brundage draft memoir, chapter xi, in Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois
Archives, Urbana (hereafter quote as ABC), box 250, reel 244.
9. Brundage draft memoir, chapter xi, 7-8. ABC, box 250, reel 244.
10. Edström to Otto Mayer, 24 March 1952, in International Olympic Committee Historical
Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter  IOC Archives): Republique populaire de
Chine, correspondence, 1924-1958.
11. For details on this internal discussion, see Fan Hong and Xiong Xiaozheng, “Communist
China: sport, politics and diplomacy,” in J. Mangan and Fan Hong, eds., Sport in Asian
Society, London, Frank Cass, 2003, 320-327.
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Given Beijing’s official policy to learn from the USSR
through most of the 1950s, this inquiry and suggestion from
Beijing’s “elder brother” carried much weight. The report
from Feng spurred Zhou Enlai to meet with him on 4
February about the Olympics issue, and Zhou forwarded
Feng’s report to Liu Shaoqi with his own recommendations
that same day. Zhou told Liu that, based on his discussion
with Feng Wenbin, he felt Beijing should send a telegram to
the IOC in the name of the All-China Sports Federation,
which then existed only in name, to declare that Taiwan
could not represent China in the Olympic movement. He
suggested demanding that the IOC allow Beijing to attend
its February meeting and the upcoming Olympic Games.
Zhou also told Liu that the telegram had already been sent,
due to the pressing deadline. 
With no understanding of China’s past involvement with the
Olympic movement, the telegram dashed off to the IOC
claimed that Beijing had just organized a national Olympic
committee and requested IOC certification for Beijing to par-
ticipate in the 1952 Games. Zhou further reported to Liu:
I estimate that if the IOC does not allow us to attend
its February meeting, then we will not attend the July
Olympic Games to avoid running into the delegation
from Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit organization. [But] if
the IOC invites us [not Chiang]. . . to attend the
February meeting, the situation is favourable to us
politically. Moreover, since the Games will take place
in Helsinki, we may attend. Even if we don’t do well
in the competition, it is not important.
Zhou asked Liu to make a decision about Beijing’s partici-
pation in both the meeting and the games, and Liu quickly
approved Zhou’s suggestion. (12) This new insight into the
background of Beijing’s early interest in the Olympic move-
ment and the 1952 Games is notable for demonstrating the
importance Party leaders placed on sports from the begin-
ning. More interestingly, it shows how Beijing chose to fight
its first major battle for international legitimacy through its
membership in the Olympic family and Olympic Games.
Once a decision had been made, Beijing acted quickly and
with determination. As IOC president Edström wrote in
June 1952, “The Communist Chinese organizations are
making all kinds of efforts to take part in the Olympic
Games in Helsinki.” (13) To make sure the IOC and the
12. “Dui zhongguo shifou canjia di shiwujie guoji aolinpike yundong hui wenti de piyu”
(Comments on the report regarding whether China should take part in the XVth Olympic
Games), February, 1952, in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiu Shi, Zhongyang
Danganguan, eds., Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao (Collections of Liu Shaoqi’s com-
ments, writings, and speeches after the founding of the PRC), Beijing, Zhongyang wenx-
ian chubanshe, 2005, 4:4-5. See also Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiu Shi,
Zhongyang Danganguan, eds, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949–1976 (Chronological biography
of Zhou Enlai), Beijing, Zhong yang wen xian chubanshe, 1997, 1:214.
13. Edström to R. M. Ritter [honorary secretary FINA], 6 June 1952, IOC Archives:
Republique Populaire de Chine, correspondence, 1924-1958.
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Top leaders attending the PRC’s first national games, 
Beijing, 1959.
Games’ organizers received Beijing’s message, the Chinese
ambassador to Finland, Geng Biao, personally involved him-
self in getting the telegram delivered on February 5. China
even sent its diplomat from Stockholm to personally visit
IOC president Edström about Beijing’s membership and
the invitation to the 1952 Games. In a presentation to
Edström on February 13 during the IOC’s Oslo session,
Sheng Zhibai argued that the PRC’s All China Athletic
Federation represented 600 million people and should be
considered the only proper participant in the Olympic move-
ment from China. He further demanded that the IOC
immediately expel Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi,
Nationalist officials still serving as IOC members for China
in exile, and decertify Taiwan’s NOC. But Edström had had
enough from the Beijing diplomat and cut him off: “My dear
sir, you are neither qualified nor entitled to give the IOC
orders or instructions!” (14)
Here Beijing made two mistakes. First, the PRC’s forceful
intervention conveyed a strident politicization of sports that
was off-putting to the IOC. Second, by not using Dong
Shouyi, the IOC member who remained in China, to com-
municate with the IOC, Beijing not only forfeited any legit-
imate claim to membership in the Olympic movement, but
also gave the impression that Dong was either dead or
imprisoned, even though the Communist government was at
that time either unaware of or uninterested in Dong Shouyi
and his IOC involvement. (15) It was Dong who learned of
Beijing’s intentions and eventually made contact with the
government. (16) Had Beijing known the IOC rules and
Olympic principles and simply asked Dong Shouyi to con-
tact the IOC, Dong might well have attended the IOC first
sessions in February that year as China’s sole representative,
given that Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi were too
demoralized to go to Helsinki after the Nationalist defeat in
the civil war. 
Erik von Frenckell, an IOC member in Finland, informed
the other IOC members that the Chinese ambassador in
Helsinki had been in contact with him and demanded to
know why Beijing had not yet been invited to the 1952
Olympic Games. Frenckell recommended to the IOC ses-
sion that it should make a decision about the China issue
before the 1 June deadline. Avery Brundage, who was to
become IOC president in 1952, declared that the IOC
must establish contact with all three Chinese members
before it could reach a decision. With the civil war raging in
China, all three members had lost contact with the IOC
back in 1948, and the Taiwan side spread a rumour that
Dong Shouyi was dead. (17) In his meeting with Sheng
Zhibai, Edström asked about Dong Shouyi and was told
that he was alive and well. “His place is here in Helsinki,”
the IOC president told Sheng, who was shadowing the IOC
session in Oslo. (18) Since the IOC rules indicated that no
athletes could participate in the Olympics unless they
belonged to an international federation, Beijing managed in
April 1952 to convince the Federation Internationale de
Natation Amateur to accept the All-China Athletic
Federation as a member by claiming that it succeeded the
previous Chinese organization and had paid up the affilia-
tion dues in arrears since 1949. (19) Beijing did the same with
pre-existing Chinese memberships in other world sports fed-
erations, including the pentathlon, gymnastics, ice hockey,
skating, volleyball, and football. 
The so-called two-China issue would have been much easi-
er for Beijing to manage had it done its homework and sent
Dong Shouyi in the first place. But because of ignorance
and its tendency to resort to high-handed methods, the
Beijing government turned what should have been a simple
sports issue into a messy political standoff. These critical
mistakes strained relations between Beijing and the IOC
from the outset. In his telegram to Beijing’s All-China
Athletic Federation, Edström wrote on 17 June 1952 that
their Olympic committee had not yet been recognized and
their travel to Helsinki would be “useless.” (20) He sent anoth-
er telegram on 8 July 1952 to Rong Gaotang, a Chinese
sports official, telling him that China was in political chaos
and the IOC had decided that no Chinese athletes “may
compete until difficulties are resolved.” He also asked Rong
to inform Dong Shouyi that his presence in Helsinki was
“desired.” (21) Despite Edström’s position, Beijing was deter-
mined to attend the Games and soon dispatched Dong to
take part in the IOC’s Helsinki session later that month.
When Dong showed up at the meetings with a translator,
Edström sent the man out of the room, since according to
IOC rules translators were not allowed to attend IOC meet-
14. For details, see the IOC minutes of 46th session, Oslo, 12-13 February 1952.
15. For details on this point, see Hua Zhi, Su yuan—Dong Shouyi zhuan (Biography of Dong
Shouyi), Beijing, Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1993, 114.
16. Hua Zhi, Su yuan – Dong Shouyi zhuan, 111-113.
17. The IOC minutes of 46th session, Oslo, 12-13 February 1952.
18. IOC: Republique populaire de Chine, Juridique, 1947-1975, folder, Peking: 1952-1958.
19. R. M. Ritter [honorary secretary FINA] to Edström, 9 June 1952, and Ritter to the All-
China Athletic Federation, 25 April 1952, IOC Archives: Republique populaire de Chine,
correspondence, 1924-1958.
20. IOC Archives: Republique populaire de Chine, Juridique, 1947-1975, folder, Peking:
1952-1958.
21. IOC Archives: Republique populaire de Chine, Juridique, 1947-1975, folder, Peking:
1952-1958.
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ings. Dong’s translator refused, saying that Dong only spoke
Chinese. According to an eye-witness report, Edström
rapped his cane on the table and said icily, “You are lying.
I spoke with him in English without any difficulties as
recently as 1948! Leave the room immediately!” The inter-
preter left, taking Dong with him. It was obvious that Beijing
did not trust Dong at that time. But it was also true that in
1951 the newly elected Russian member Konstantin
Andrianov attended the IOC session in Vienna with an
interpreter without a fuss from the IOC. Only at its 1954
session in Athens did the IOC decide that newly elected
IOC members must have an adequate knowledge of French
or English or both. (22)
Dong’s appearance at the Helsinki session accomplished lit-
tle for the IOC, since he was in no position to resolve the
problems surrounding Beijing’s demands. J. Sigrid Edström
reminded members that Beijing’s athletes were waiting in
Leningrad for an invitation. (23) Forced into a quick decision,
the IOC executive board proposed not to accept either
Taiwan or Beijing for the 1952 Olympic Games. This obvi-
ous dodge was not very effective, given that, as Erik von
Frenckell pointed out, Taiwan’s NOC had already been rec-
ognized and could not be excluded from the Games.
Frenckell then suggested that the athletes of both Chinas be
allowed to take part. When the IOC session voted 29-22 to
allow both teams to participate at Helsinki, the IOC put
aside a decision on Beijing’s membership until later. On 18
July, one day before the opening ceremony of the Helsinki
Games, the IOC finally extended invitations to both Beijing
and Taipei. Taiwan’s  and the  IOC’stactical  e rrors
Taiwan’s successful efforts to remain in the Olympic move-
ment after 1949 had more to do with Cold War internation-
al politics than the effectiveness of its policy. The fact that
most Western countries diplomatically recognized Taipei
rather than Beijing up to the 1970s gave Taiwan powerful
leverage in the IOC. Taiwan, after all, continued to repre-
sent China even in the United Nations until 1971. Taipei
did make several astute moves, one of which was to claim
political legitimacy directly from the Republic of China,
founded in 1912 and a member of the Olympic movement
since 1922; Taipei also immediately notified the IOC of the
Chinese National Olympic Committee’s change of address
to Taiwan after the Nationalist government fled the main-
land. These moves in the long run helped Taipei to remain
part of the Olympic family, no matter how hard Beijing tried
to dislodge it. (24) Even with all these advantages, however,
the Nationalist government, like its mainland counterpart,
made several mistakes in its negotiations over the member-
ship issue. 
One mistake was its handling of the 1952 Olympic Games.
Initially, the Nationalist government intended to take part in
the Games and started to prepare for them in 1951. On 3
March 1951, the government allocated NT$80,000 for
selecting and training athletes. But on 10 May 1951, Hao
Gengsheng, an important sports leader who had moved to
Taiwan with the Nationalists, suggested that Taiwan not par-
ticipate in the Helsinki Games because the USSR, attend-
ing the Games for the first time, might use the forum to con-
front Taiwan. This bad advice swayed the cabinet. When
Taipei learned that Beijing had been invited to participate,
its decision not to attend was strengthened on the principle
of han zei bu liang li. In other words, the rationale of “no
two Chinas” actually lay behind Taipei’s thinking at this
point, long before Beijing embraced it as grounds for with-
drawing from the Olympic movement. (25) In an official letter
to IOC president Edström dated 19 July 1952, the
Nationalist Olympic committee wrote, “as a protest against
the resolution adopted at the plenary session of the
International Olympic Committee on July 17, 1952, which
compromises the right and position of the Chinese National
Committee as the only legal and recognized national
Olympic committee of China, I beg to inform you that we
have decided to withdraw our participation in the 1952
Helsinki Olympic Games.” This letter was signed by Hao
Gengsheng, president of the Taiwan NOC. (26) In its official
statement, Taiwan’s NOC protested that by “allowing
Chinese Communists to participate in the 1952 Olympics in
Helsinki,” the IOC’s decision was “unlawful as it approves
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22. But the new rule said that existing members who were not familiar with these languages
could be assisted by an interpreter. In other words, the IOC used a pretext to reprimand
Beijing during their first official contact. This was not good for its own credibility, either.
23. The minutes of the IOC session, Helsinki, July 1952. 
24. For details on Taiwan’s relations with the IOC in the early 1950s, see Hao Gengsheng,
Hao Gengsheng hui yi lu (Memoirs of Hao Gengsheng), Taipei, Zhuan ji wen xue chuban-
she, 1969, 40-54, 72-95.
25. Tang Mingxin, an important sport scholar and official in Taiwan, later claimed that
Taiwan’s withdrawal from the 1952 Olympic Games and late march “under protest” in
the 1960 Rome Olympics were not good choices, since neither helped Taiwan’s effort to
stay in the Olympic movement under the name of Republic of China. See Tang Mingxin,
Tang Mingxin xiansheng fangwen jilu (The reminiscences of Mr. Tang Mingxin, inter-
viewed by Zhang Qixiong and Pan Guangzhe), Taipei, Institute of Modern History,
Academia Sinica, 2005, 176-177.
26. Announcement of withdrawal from participation in the XVth Olympiad Helsinki 1952 by
Chinese National Olympic Committee, 17 July 1952, Hao Gengsheng to Edström, 19 July
1952, IOC Archives: Republique Populaire de Chine, histoire, 1952-1986.
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entry of competitors from China not entered by the Chinese
National Olympic Committee, which is the only legal
national Olympic committee of China and has been recog-
nized as such for many years.” (27) Taiwan’s decision not to
participate in the Helsinki Games, however, left the door
open for Beijing to step in uncontested and make its debut
in the international sports arena. (28) Of course, as explained
later, the IOC’s mixed signals to Taiwan about its participa-
tion in the 1952 Olympic Games also played a role in
Taiwan’s eventual decision not to participate. (29)
The Nationalists made another mistake in failing to act regard-
ing the two IOC members Kong Xiangxi and Wang
Zhengting, whose involvement in IOC matters had long
lapsed, leaving them confronted with forced resignation. Kong,
who served as Secretary of the Treasury in the Nationalist gov-
ernment and had been an IOC member since 1939, had never
even attended an IOC meeting. While in theory IOC mem-
bers were chosen by the IOC itself and functioned as Olympic
ambassadors to the countries from which they were chosen,
individual states retained a degree of influence through their
national Olympic committees. It should have been especially
important to Taipei communicate with these two members
more effectively and have more voices at the table as it
engaged in a membership war with Beijing. Brundage, who
was obviously pro-Taiwan, advised Hao Gengsheng even
before the Helsinki Games that “the important thing now is
for Nationalist China to have its representative at Helsinki pre-
pared to fight vigorously for its recognition by the different
international federations and the International Olympic
Committee. This is a very serious situation.” (30)
As it turned out, during the crucial diplomatic battle
between Taipei and Beijing over membership in the
Olympic movement, the only contribution Kong Xiangxi
made was to write to Otto Mayer on 29 February 1952 to
oppose the IOC’s recognition of the All-China Athletic
Federation “because it is against the rules of the
International Olympic Committee which states that the
national Olympic committee of any country must be affiliat-
ed with the IOC.” Kong commented, “I believe the
Olympic committee of China is still in existence and func-
tioning on Taiwan.” (31) In a cablegram on 22 April 1954,
Brundage told Hao Gengsheng bluntly that it was “most
important you have someone at Athens. Wang [Zhengting]
and Kung [Xiangxi] are both delinquent according to rules
and liable to forfeit [their] memberships because of repeat-
ed non-attendance.” (32) After prompting by the IOC, Kong
finally tendered his resignation in a letter to Brundage on 24
June 1955. (33) Wang Zhengting, although more involved in
the IOC than Kong, rarely took part in IOC meetings and
other activities after the 1948 London Olympic Games. He
sent his resignation to Brundage in 1954, but changed his
mind and eventually resigned for good in 1957. (34) It thus
transpired that over the course of these crucial develop-
ments, Taipei had no active IOC members, while Beijing’s
Dong Shouyi aggressively asserted Beijing’s interests.
If both Beijing and Taipei made mistakes negotiating their
membership conflicts regarding the 1952 Olympic Games,
the IOC itself may also be called on to shoulder an impor-
tant share of the blame. In hindsight, the IOC seems to
have been incompetent and ignorant in dealing with the two-
China issue. 
The IOC’s first misstep was its readiness to change the
China NOC’s address from mainland China to Taiwan in
1951. When Hao Gengsheng, on behalf of the Taiwan’s
sports authority, informed the IOC that the office of the
Chinese Olympic committee had been relocated from
Nanjing to Taipei, the IOC bureaucrats did not understand
the enormous political significance of the shift and simply
recorded the change of address in issue 28 of the Olympic
Review. Only later on did Avery Brundage realize the mis-
step: “After the revolution in China, we received notice from
its national Olympic committee for a change in address to
Taipei, Taiwan. The change had been made on the records
in the IOC office in Lausanne as a purely routine matter,
without any thought of the political significance.” (35)
It is fair to point out that Edström had tried to determine the
significance of the address change. He wrote, “It is essential
that we learn to know which is the proper Olympic Committee
of China. We have had a letter from China National Amateur
Athletic Federation, 147 West Gate Street, Hsin Chu,
Taiwan. This federation claims to be the National Olympic
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Committee of China.” (36) Unfortunately he did not pursue the
matter further after Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi sim-
ply claimed that the NOC in Taiwan was the right one. (37) As
Edström told Otto Mayer, the IOC chancellor, “I do not want
to spend more time on this Chinese question.” (38)
Regardless of who was to blame, the damage was done, and
it was not until June 1952 that Erik von Frenckell, IOC
member and chairman of the 1952 Helsinki Olympic
Games organizing committee, wrote to Edström to protest
the handling of the address change. He pointed out, “The
change of the address of the Chinese Olympic committee
from Peking to Taiwan has been a mistake, not confirmed by
the Executive Committee nor by the Congresses.” He sug-
gested to Edström that “this question should be finally set-
tled by the Congress [IOC session] in Helsinki.” (39) But
matters were not to improve soon: Edström’s successor,
Avery Brundage, chose to follow Edström’s policy. As
Brundage wrote to Edström in 1952, “The Chinese situa-
tion is indeed a most complicated and difficult one. As you
say, it is hard to tell what to do.” (40)
The IOC’s passivity led to another misstep, namely, its
hasty decision to allow both Beijing and Taipei to take part
in the 1952 Games. When Beijing broached its intention to
join the Games, the IOC was not at all prepared to respond
and was forced to make an ad hoc decision, since the new
sports authority in Beijing was not an official Olympic com-
mittee and Taipei claimed to represent China. As Brundage
told Edström at this crucial moment, “The most that we can
do would be to recognize both [Beijing and Taipei] and this,
of course, we have refused to do in the case of Germany.
The whole situation is most difficult and it is too bad that we
can’t get through the next two months without taking a
stand.” (41) Edström initially decided to allow neither Beijing
nor Taipei to participate in the Helsinki Games and so noti-
fied them by telegram in mid-June. (42) The IOC president-
elect Brundage wrote to Edström, “Your action on the
Chinese question in notifying both organizations that they
are not eligible to participate at Helsinki, as I wrote to your
before, is the correct one.” (43) But Edström was not naïve
enough to believe that the problem was solved with this deci-
sion. As he told Otto Mayer the very day he decided to bar
both parties, “We will probably have a great fight about this
matter in Helsinki with the Russian delegates and other
friends from behind the iron Curtain.” (44)
Attacks soon came from many directions. The Helsinki
Games organizing committee chair Frenckell protested
Edström’s decision, telling him that “we have been informed
that FIFA, FIBA and FINA [the corresponding
International Federations] have accepted the Peking
Chinese as representatives of China.” (45) As a matter of fact,
the Helsinki organizing committee had already sent invita-
tions to both parties to join the Games before Edström
informed Beijing and Taiwan not to come. 
Given the fast-approaching deadline for the beginning of the
Games and the strong criticisms he was facing, Edström
asked IOC members to vote on two proposals in a general
session: 1) No Chinese team should be allowed to partici-
pate, or 2) Both teams should be allowed to compete. The
second proposal won by 29 votes to 22. The IOC executive
board, however, requested an additional vote on a proposal
by French member Francois Pietri, who wanted the IOC to
approve participants only in those sports for which their
national federations were affiliated with the relevant interna-
tional federation. Pietri’s proposal won by 33 votes to 20. To
be on the safe side, Avery Brundage, newly elected to suc-
ceed Edström, suggested that the IOC should not recognize
either of the Chinese national Olympic committees until
later. But even this compromise, as Brundage himself admit-
ted, “breaks our own rules… because it is inspired by the
sympathy we feel for the sportsmen who are on the way to
Helsinki.” (46) This represented a complete reversal of the
original decision. The IOC seemed to be at its wit’s end and
could come up with no other solution. Thus it committed the
fiasco of inviting Beijing to attend the Games just one day
before the Games kicked off.
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Bei j ing  marches  into theOlympic  movement  
The new PRC government was certainly quick to under-
stand the significance of the Olympic Games to their politi-
cal legitimacy and took action with amazing speed. Having
finally gotten the green light from the IOC, Mao Zedong,
Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai, the PRC’s three top leaders,
immediately approved the decision for Beijing to attend the
Olympic Games, although the decision was not made pub-
lic until 23 July, after Beijing learned that Taiwan would not
attend the Olympics. Late in the evening of 24 July, Zhou
met with delegation leaders and told them that although
Beijing was late for the Games, “It is a victory for the PRC
when its flag is flying at the [Helsinki] Olympic Games.
Being late was not our fault.” (47) The delegation left for
Finland on 25 July and arrived in Helsinki on 29 July, one
day before the closing ceremony. It failed to take part in any
competition; one of its swimmers participated in a prelimi-
nary competition but he failed to qualify for the next
round. (48) Even so, Beijing did participate in some of the
Games’ cultural programs, and Zhou Enlai had personally
examined the program that would be performed by the
Chinese entertainment acrobatic troupe in its visit of
Helsinki. Zhou told the acrobatic entertainers that they
were China’s national treasures and expressed the hope that
they would win glory for the motherland. (49)
Beijing’s principal interest in the Olympic Games and
Olympic movement was to seek legitimacy in the world
arena in the face of the recognition by Western countries
widely commanded by the Nationalist government in
Taiwan. As the Russians had made abundantly clear, the
Helsinki Games provided an important platform for such
efforts. Simply being there and seeing its flag fly with those
of other countries counted as a victory for the new govern-
ment in Beijing. (50) Moreover, by setting one foot in the
Olympics in 1952, Beijing again forced the IOC’s hand.
The very day the Chinese delegation departed Helsinki on
3 August 1952, the Beijing government fired off a telegram
to Otto Mayer, the IOC’s chancellor, and demanded that
the IOC approve Beijing’s membership in the Olympic
movement. (51) The IOC did just that in 1954 by formally rec-
ognizing the Chinese Olympic Committee. 
Thus between 1954 and 1958, both Taiwan and Beijing
claimed to represent “China” in the Olympic family. But
Beijing was not happy to have Taipei remain in the Olympic
movement and strongly protested the representation of
China by two rival regimes. In 1958, concluding that the
IOC was hostile to Beijing and followed a pro-Taiwan and
pro-Two-China policy, Beijing officially broke off its relation-
ship with the Olympic movement. This decision was made
by China’s top leaders, and under direct instruction from
Deng Xiaoping, China’s sport commission summarily with-
drew from 11 international sport organizations that accepted
Taiwan’s membership. (52) Beijing did not return to the
Olympic movement until 1979, when the IOC made con-
cessions to Beijing by changing Taiwan’s NOC name to
Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and forbidding Taipei
from using its flag, anthem, or emblem in the Olympic move-
ment. 
It is also worth pointing out that Taiwan did not play a com-
pletely passive role in these developments. Taiwan realized
that the IOC-mandated English name, the Chinese Taipei
Olympic Committee, could not be changed, but Taiwan
could manipulate the Chinese translation of that name.
Beijing insisted that it should read Zhongguo Taibei, but
Taipei made it Zhonghua Taibei, throwing the two sides
into another serious dispute. The one character difference
was important, according to Wu Jingguo, an IOC member
from Taipei involved directly in the negotiations, because it
implied whether or not Taiwan was subordinate to Beijing’s
Chinese Olympic Committee. Several secret meetings were
held in Hong Kong to work out a solution, and in the end it
was Deng Xiaoping who finally decided to accept Taiwan’s
translation. In 1989, Beijing and Taiwan signed an official
agreement regarding the Taipei’s NOC’s Chinese name. (53)
It is important to point out that the final solution of the two-
China issue in the IOC and in other international sports fed-
erations reflected Deng Xiaoping’s concept of one-country-
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two-systems. Many people are aware that Deng developed
this concept to deal with Hong Kong’s return from British
colonial control, but few realize that the idea was first
applied in resolving the Olympic dispute with Taiwan. More
importantly, pragmatic attitudes on both sides of the straits
and avoiding the mistakes of the past allowed Chinese in
both the PRC and Taiwan to take part in the Olympics and
other international events together. Taiwan, of course, was
not happy with the conditions imposed on it, but being pres-
ent under whatever name conferred a sense of legitimacy
that was increasingly eroding in other world forums. Since
then, although Taiwan and Beijing continue to be political
rivals, their athletes have competed in the Games together,
and Taiwan’s status as a National Olympic Committee has
in all respects been fully maintained and respected. Unlike
the old zero-sum game perspective, the hard-won solution
has proved a win-win situation, and suggests a model that
could serve as a basis for future political relations between
Beijing and Taiwan. 
The Taiwan formula also served as a model for dealing with
Hong Kong following its return to Chinese sovereignty in
1997. Hong Kong was first accepted as a member of
Olympic movement in 1950, while it was still a British
colony, and retained its membership in the Olympic move-
ment with Beijing’s blessing; two days after the handover,
Hong Kong and the IOC signed an agreement on 3 July
1997 that declared, “It is the common aim to enable the
people of Hong Kong to continue taking part in the
Olympic Games and generally in sports competitions every-
where as a separate and independent entity.” In the new
arrangement, Hong Kong’s Olympic committee would add
“China” to “Hong Kong” in its committee designation in
accordance with the Basic Law; Hong Kong teams would
fly the flag of the Special Administrative Region at all times,
while the Chinese National Anthem would be played on
official occasions such as flag-raising and victory ceremonies.
According to the agreement, the initials “HKG” would be
maintained, and the emblem would feature the bauhinia
blossom with the Five Rings and the Chinese characters
Zhongguo Xianggang all within a circle, followed by “Hong
Kong” with “CHINA” underneath. (54)
Juan Samaranch, who served as the IOC president from
1983 to 2001, once boasted that “we are the only interna-
tional organization in the world—sports organization or
other—that recognizes as full members the national Olympic
committees of the People’s Republic of China and Chinese
Taipei.” However, looking back at the history of the China
issue in the IOC, the organization has little to be proud of.
Still, given the rocky early phase of their relations between
1958 and 1979, it is amazing to see how the IOC and
Beijing have become close allies, always willing to boost
each other’s interests in preparation for the 2008 Summer
Olympic Games. It now remains to be seen how the Beijing
Olympics will affect China’s national representation. •
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